
# A Clear Logical Argument... Guaranteed:

making compelling lines of reasoning in court



Oregon Department of Justice

2014 CLE (approved for 3.75 credits)

Joseph A. Laronge, JD

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
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# Basic Terminology



There are actually very few words (terms) that need to be mentioned first when beginning to discuss logical reasoning.

<u>CONCLUSION</u>: A conclusion is the statement that you want the audience to accept as true. Sometimes it is called a claim, contention, or thesis. It's the perspective of reality that you want to prove is a "fact." For example: "Henry is a British subject."


<u>REASON</u>: A reason is the line of connected sentences (premises) that are intended to lead the audience to accept that the conclusion is true with some degree of certainty. For example,

"Henry was born in Bermuda." "Someone born in Bermuda is a British subject."

<u>PREMISE</u>: A premise is a sentence that when connected (linked) to other sentences form a line of reasoning.

ARGUMENT: An argument is the combination of the conclusion and the reason.

# A Logical Argument



A "good" argument depends on the believability of it premises and a structurally correct logical form.

The degree to which the court accepts your conclusion (e.g., contention, claim, or thesis) as true—such as beyond a reasonable doubt—largely depends on the court's subjective opinion of the strength (e.g., goodness, quality, or probative weight) of the reasoning that leads to that conclusion.

That individually judged reasoning strength, like the strength of a *bridge*, depends on two primary characteristics:

- I. The degree to which the sentences (premises) that comprise the line of reasoning are subjectively perceived to be true.
- 2. Whether the audience perceives the structure (e.g., form or pattern) of the argument to be logical (structurally correct).



The logic of reasoning depends on the underlying structural form of its sentences (premises and conclusion).

To guarantee that an argument is logical, the meaning of the sentences (**premises**) that together form the line of reasoning and that of the **conclusion** being asserted (contention, claim, or thesis) must be capable of being expressed in words that can combine together in a **defined logical structure**, form, or pattern.

And just like for any bridge that holds together, there are different strictly defined structurally correct designs necessary for certain types of arguments to be logical.











The underlying structure of a good line of reasoning may not always be readily apparent.

Just as the necessary structurally correct design of a sound bridge may not always be readily apparent on the surface, the underlying logical structure of a good line of reasoning may not always be readily apparent in the arrangement of its presented sentences and words.

So it is critical that the logic of the argument be self-evident to the court to be accepted.






Infinity Loop Bridge, Zhuhai, China




Infinity Loop Bridge, Zhuhai, China

# The Logic-bridge



\*The formal name of this universal logical form is Defeasible Class-Inclusion Transitivity (DCIT, dee •kit).






There is an all-purpose structure or template to make any logical argument—the <u>Logic-bridge</u>.\* The design is user-friendly, rigorous, robust, and foolproof.

Any type of logical argument (e.g., deductive, inductive, abductive, or argument schemes) can be built using the identical <a href="Logic-bridge">Logic-bridge</a> structure or template.


Metaphorically, it resembles a cantilever style bridge. Each horizontal *span* represents each of the two or more sentences (premises) that link together to form the logical line of reasoning that leads to the conclusion (finish).

And the vertical *piers* beneath each *span* represent the supporting assumptions for each linked premise in the line of reasoning.

## **Premise Structure**





\*Any sentence can be structured in this categorical form. 1




Each sentence (premise) of the <u>Logic-bridge</u> line of reasoning consists of three parts:\*


- SUBJECT [phrase] of the premise (starting colored end-cap of the span);
- 2. PREDICATE [phrase] of the same premise (ending colored cap of the span); and,
- 3. NEXUS of Predication that joins them.








SUBJECT COLUMN	PREDICATE COLUMN
The President	is a natural born U.S.





"The SUBJECT is a noun [phrase].
That's a person, place or thing.
It's who or what the sentence is about
And the PREDICATE is the verb [phrase].
That's the action word.
That gets the subject up and out."








These are examples of parsing sentences into their SUBJECT [phrase] and PREDICATE [phrase] halves.

















The strength of that relationship represents an individual's subjective perception of the amount (load) of certainty (e.g., believability, acceptability, or likelihood) of the truth of that premise that it can support.



# **Linking Premises**





\*The word "such" means "like the original subject." While technically needed, in practice it can be dropped.




The sentences (premises) of the <u>Logic-bridge</u> line of reasoning are arranged in a specific order by linking each other back to front.

This linkage is created by the PREDICATE of one sentence matching the SUBJECT of the next sentence in the line of reasoning plus an added universal [e.g., Any, All, One (such)\*].







## Start and Finish




The SUBJECT [phrase] and PREDICATE [phrase] of the CONCLUSION bound the ends of the line of reasoning.





Besides the matching linkage and resulting order of the premises, the Logic-bridge requires that the SUBJECT of the first premise and the PREDICATE of the last premise in the line of reasoning form the CONCLUSION (claim or thesis).







# **Amount of Certainty**







Assume you subjectively perceive the first premise having the probative load bearing strength to support a 50% level of certainty of being true. But the second premise is perceived to have the strength to support a 100% level of certainty of being true.










A CONCLUSION reached (justified) from one line of reasoning (without objections) possesses only the smallest subjective level of certainty of truth (e.g., 50%) that can be supported by any one of its premises. So the certainty of a CONCLUSION (e.g., guilty beyond a reasonable doubt) in this context can never be stronger than the weakest premise in the logical line of reasoning.




Two identical perfectly logical arguments can have different individually subjective degrees of strength.


The amount of certainty that any one PREMISE can support and the resulting amount of certainty for the CONCLUSION that is reached (justified) is a subjective judgment by each individual traveling the line of reasoning. But both arguments are perfectly logical.


## COURT'S PERCEPTION

# SUBJECT COLUMN The President... Any (all/one) who (that) [REPEAT PREVIOUS PREDICATE]... Therefore, CONCLUSION The President... The President... The President... In the President of the P




## COUNSEL'S PERCEPTION







# Qualifiers




These examples illustrate the using QUALIFIERS to possibly increase the perceived level of certainty by the court for the conclusion. Examples of QUALIFIERS include the following: some, many, most, probably, likely, possibly, generally etc.




	SUBJECT COLUMN		PREDICATE COLUMN		
1	The President	80	possibly has a valid Hawaiian birth certificate.		
2	Any (all/one) who (that) [REPEAT PREVIOUS PREDICATE]	10	<u>was possibly born in</u> <u>Hawaii.</u>		
Therefore, CONCLUSION					
	The President	80	<u>was possibly born in</u> <u>Hawaii.</u>		







# Assumptions



An ASSUMPTION provides necessary or ancillary support to the premise it supports.

There can be many assumptions supporting a premise. And the subjective level of certainty of the truth of a premise can be impacted by the level of certainty of any of its assumptions.





"The charges against defendant arose out of a domestic fight between defendant and Payne, who is his ex-girlfriend and the mother of his two daughters. The children, ages 5 and 3 at the time, were home during the fight...They argued some more, during which time he hit her in the face. She believed it was with an open hand, but she couldn't recall at that time. He knocked her to the floor a couple of times, and she fought back, left the residence, went to the neighbor's house where she had them call 911."

## <u>Prove It! /</u> constructing stronger lines of logical reasoning

State of Oregon v. Bivens, 191 Or App 460, 83 P.3d 379, (2004)

"In charging him with felony assault, the state alleged that the assaultive conduct was witnessed by the older of the two children. Specifically, the indictment pleaded:

"The defendant, on or about 03/16/00, in the County of Umatilla and State of Oregon, did unlawfully and intentionally cause physical injury to Noel Payne by striking her in the face, and the defendant's conduct was witnessed by [C], the minor child of the defendant and Noel Payne.

Consequently, the burden fell on the state to prove that C, the older of the two children, witnessed defendant striking Payne in the face. See <u>State v. Reynolds</u>, 183 Or App 245, 251, 51 P3d 684, rev den 335 Or 90 (2002) (factors that aggravate fourth-degree assault to a felony are material elements of the offense)."

## <u>Prove It! /</u> constructing stronger lines of logical reasoning

State of Oregon v. Bivens, 191 Or App 460, 83 P.3d 379, (2004)

"To be sure, the record provides an ample basis for the first two steps in that line of logic. Payne's testimony provided the jury with a basis to conclude that the children were in their bedroom during most of the argument, and in particular were there toward the end of the argument when defendant slapped Payne in the face.

Both Payne's testimony and that of the investigating officers provide sufficient grounds to conclude that the argument and the fight could be easily heard in other areas of the house, and easily seen if doors were open. But the third step in the state's line of logic requires several additional intermediate inferences."

## A Logical Argument...Guaranteed!

State of Oregon v. Bivens, 191 Or App 460, 83 P.3d 379, (2004)


"To infer that the children heard the assault, as distinct from the general argument and fight between the parties, a factfinder would first have to infer that the openhand slap made a distinctive sound.

Did the sound of the slap rise above the noise of the argument or the other sounds of their physical fighting? The record is silent. No predicate facts assist in informing any inference, and any conclusion would constitute speculation or guesswork.

Did the children hear it or see it,


did C in particular identify it for what it was--that is, the sound of defendant slapping Payne?


But even that inference requires the further inference that the children--and the five-year-old in particular--paid attention to the fight."



Payne's children...

... heard the openhand slap to Payne's face by defendant.






1. The children...

were in the house at the time of the argument.

- 2. Any who...
  were in the house at the time
  of the argument
  ...would have heard the
  arguing of the defendant and
- **3.** Any who... would have heard the arguing of the defendant and Payne
- ... heard the open-hand slap to Payne's face by defendant.



"The open hand slap made a distinctive sound."


"[T]he sound of the slap rose above the noise of the argument."

Payne.

Any such child "was sufficiently mature to distinguish the assaultive conduct from other aspects of the fight."

Any such child paid particular "attention to the fight."

- 1. The children...
- were in the house at the time of the argument.
- 2. Any who... were in the house at the time of the argument ...would have heard the arguing of the defendant and Payne.
- **3.** Any who... would have heard the arguing of the defendant and Payne
- ... heard the open-hand slap to Payne's face by defendant.



"The open hand slap made a distinctive sound."


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
Any such child "was sufficiently mature to distinguish the assaultive conduct from other aspects of the fight."

Any such child paid particular "attention to the fight."


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




### **Assumption Sets**



Different defined ASSUMPTION SETS can accompany certain types of inference steps such as ones that depend upon <u>RELIABILITY OF A SOURCE</u>, ANALOGY, SAMPLE GENERALIZING.




#### A Logical Argument...Guaranteed! MAIN CONCLUSION: The President was born in Hawaii. STUDENT: My line of reasoning consists of two premises: 1. The President...was born in Hawaii according to the witness. 2. One who was born in Hawaii according to the witness... was born in Hawaii. ...was born in The President... Hawaii. Therefore, the President was born in Hawaii. CERTAINTY finish start The Witness The Witness The Witness had The The level of The Witness The Witness focused his Witness intended to had personal the necessary certainty of is not knowledge attention for a perceptual and had the Witness personally be truthful. sufficient is sufficient. biased. (i.e., was in a cognitive adequate period of time position to capabilities to memory know). to observe the witness and capabilities. understand. event.

ASSUMPTION SETS / WIT


#### A Logical Argument...Guaranteed!

Different defined ASSUMPTION SETS can accompany certain types of inference steps such as ones that depend upon <u>RELIABILITY OF A SOURCE</u>, ANALOGY, SAMPLE GENERALIZING.




#### A Logical Argument...Guaranteed!

Different defined ASSUMPTION SETS can accompany certain types of inference steps such as ones that depend upon <u>RELIABILITY OF A SOURCE</u>, ANALOGY, SAMPLE GENERALIZING.




Different defined ASSUMPTION SETS can accompany certain types of inference steps such as ones that depend upon RELIABILITY OF A SOURCE, <u>ANALOGY</u>, SAMPLE GENERALIZING.



ASSUMPTION SETS / "BY ANALOGY"

Generalizing in many circumstances is also called induction.

Different defined ASSUMPTION SETS can accompany certain types of inference steps such as ones that depend upon RELIABILITY OF SOURCE, ANALOGY, **GENERALIZING**.



ASSUMPTION SETS / GENERALIZING

66...the possibility that the fleeing person is entirely innocent.\*\*


"Among some citizens, particularly minorities and those residing in high crime areas, there is also the possibility that the fleeing person is entirely innocent, but, with or without justification, believes that contact with the police can itself be dangerous, apart from any criminal activity associated with the officer's sudden presence."

Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000). \*

The defendant was a member of a minority class in a high-crime area.

Ancillary supporting assumption for Linked Premise 3


		DCIT LINKED PREMISES					
	#	CO	MPLEX SUBJECT	COMPLEX PREDICATE			
	1	<b>→</b>	The defendant	fled from the crime scene according to Witness A.			
	2	One such who	fled from the crime scene according to Witness A	actually fled from the crime scene.			
	3	One such who	actually fled from the crime scene	was plausibly just fleeing for fear of police abuse.			
	4	One such who	was plausibly just fleeing for fear of police abuse	was probably unlawfully arrested by the police fleeing the crime scene.			
		CONCLUSION					
			The defendant	was probably unlawfully arrested by the police fleeing the crime scene.			
		ASSUMPTIONS TO LINKED PREMISES					
	2	Witness A was testifying free from duress. (ANCILLARY)					
		Witness A had the cognitive capacity to remember the incident. (NECESSARY)					
	3	The defendant was a member of a minority class in a high-crime area. (ANCILLARY)					



cautionary note to uncritical reliance on a standardized list of Critical Questions or assumptions attached to any Argument Scheme."


Wardlow illustrates that the choice and degree of acceptability of generalizations, whether structured as transitively-linked premises, assumptions (ancillary or necessary), or implicit in Critical Questions attached to Argument Schemes can be dependent on the worldview of the audience [59]. This fact provides a cautionary note to uncritical reliance on a standardized list of Critical Questions or assumptions attached to any Argument Scheme. Such constructions of stereotypical reasoning must always account for the fact that one group's sound stereotypical reasoning may be unsound from another group's worldview [24]. And what is a Critical Question or assumption for one group may not be critical for another.

## **Design Summary**




- **1.** Each individual inferential premise (e.g., singular, compound, or relational) is regimented into a categorical form of Subject and Predicate.
- **2.** The premises are ordered as follows:
  - A. The Subject of the first premise must be the Subject of the conclusion.
  - B. The complex Predicate phrase of the last premise in the line of reasoning must be the complex Predicate phrase of the conclusion.
  - C. The remaining complex Predicate phrases of each premise must be the Subject of the following premise prefaced by a universal quantifier (e.g., One [like the First Subject] who..., One [like the First Subject] that...; Any such [like the First Subject] who..., Any such [like the First Subject] that...) creating a transitively-linked chain of premises in this distinct order.
- **3.** For each linked premise, any associated non-linking assumptions that provide some degree of support (necessary or ancillary) are appropriately added.


### Multiple Linkages



A line of reasoning can consist of multiple linkages rather than just one. These blank figures illustrate four matching linkages which connect five premises.




This example illustrates an actual line of reasoning with multiple linkages (formed from predicate/subject matching of adjoining premises).



1 Payne's children	were in the house at the time of the argument.
2 So they	would have heard the arguing of the defendant and Payne.
3 So they	heard the open-hand slap to Payne's face by defendant.
So they	personally saw or through some other first-hand sense or sensation was conscious of and recognized the assaultive conduct as it occurred.
5 So they	directly perceived the assaultive conduct as it occurred.
6 So they	witnessed the assaultive conduct as it occurred.
So they	met the element to enhance the assault to a felony through such witnessing.
Therefore,	CONCLUSION
So they	witnessed the assault to Payne which met the element to enhance the assault to a felony.

### John Henry Wigmore



John Henry Wigmore's chart method is another informal logic argument structure to compare with DCIT. It was developed for legal scholarship (Wigmore, 1937). It went over, however, like a "lead balloon" (Twining, 1985, p. 165).

One of its difficulties may have been its complexity. Anderson, Schum & Twining (2005) have attempted to revive its use with suggested modifications. Neither the Wigmore chart method nor their modifications, however, provide a required form for premises that would clearly established a linkage between the premises.

And in Wigmore's examples, many of the connections between the premises relied upon implicit premises. The next slide is an example of a charting of evidence done by Wigmore (1937).

Here, P = Driver S did deliver the money to clerk H; plaintiff denies this, i. e. his

Pn = Driver S did not deliver it.

T1 = H's receipt testimonially admitting the delivery

→ P2=S did deliver.

This is explained away by C1 = H's practice (testified to by himself = T5) to sign the receipt although the goods were left on the sidewalk and not brought to him.


T2 = H's testimony on the stand that the package was not delivered.

T3 = F's testimony to C2 = the company's rule requiring com-

plete delivery by drivers, and this C2  $\longrightarrow$  C3 = the habit of drivers in general to deliver completely, which  $\longrightarrow$  C4 = the habit of driver S to deliver completely. But T4=H's testimony T5 that S did not habitually do so.

Then C5 = S's thieving practices (testified to by F = T6)  $\longrightarrow P1 = \text{he did not deliver the money, but kept it for himself.}$ 


Thus, the evidence would plot:



Thus, if we accept C1 as explaining away T1, and doubt C4 because denied by T4, and if we give credit to T2 and C5, we arrive at the final inference (as the Court did) that the money package was not delivered. In this case, American Express Co. v. Haggard (1865), the issue was whether a package of money was every received at the David D. Haggard business through delivery by American Express.

While there was signed receipt that the money was delivered to Mr. Haggard's son, a clerk H, at the business, his son claimed that the package never was delivered. The next slide illustrates a DCAT argument structure for these inferences which makes the connections between the premises apparent.

This example also illustrates the concept on attacking the opponent's arguments which is discussed further in the following section. The slides thereafter show the Wigmore argument in a DCIT template format.



		Subject phrase	Predicate phrase
$\mathbf{D}_1$	<b>→</b>	Driver S	was a driver for Am. Express.
D <sub>2</sub>	Any who	was a driver for Am. Express	was, according to F's testimony, subject to the company's rule for all drivers, requiring complete delivery.
<b>D</b> <sub>3</sub>	Any who	was, according to F's testimony, subject to the company's rule for all drivers, requiring complete delivery	was subject to the company's rule, for all drivers, requiring complete delivery.
<b>D</b> <sub>4</sub>	Any who	was subject to the company's rule, for all drivers, requiring complete delivery	was in a class of drivers which in general had the habit for complete delivery.
<b>D</b> <sub>5</sub>	Any who	was in a class of drivers which in general had the habit for complete delivery	had the habit to deliver completely
$\mathbf{D}_6$	Any who	had the habit to deliver completely	did deliver the money to clerk H
		CON	ICLUSION


		Defendant's 1 <sup>st</sup> l	NFERENCE LINE
		Subject phrase	Predicate phrase
<b>D</b> <sub>8</sub>	<b>→</b>	Driver S	had a signed receipt admitting the delivery by him.
<b>D</b> <sub>9</sub>	Any who	had a signed receipt admitting the delivery by him	did deliver the money to clerk H.
		COI	NCLUSION
$\mathbf{D}_7$		Driver S did deliv	ver the money to clerk H.

		Subject phrase	Predicate phrase	
P <sub>1</sub>	<b>→</b>	Driver S	did not, according to clerk H, deliver the money to clerk H.	
P <sub>2</sub>	Any who	did not, according to clerk H, deliver the money to clerk H	did not deliver the money to clerk H.	
		CONCLUSION		
P <sub>3</sub>   D <sub>1</sub>		Driver S did not de	liver the money to clerk H.	

		Subject phrase	Predicate phrase
P <sub>4</sub>	<b>→</b>	Driver S	stole, according to F, from company packages.
P <sub>5</sub>	Any who	stole, according to F, from company packages	did steal from company packages.
P <sub>6</sub>	Any who	did steal from company packages	did not deliver the money to clerk H.
		CON	NCLUSION

	PLAINTIFF'S IN-LINE BLOCKING OBJECTION			
		Subject phrase	Predicate phrase	
P <sub>7</sub>	<b>→</b>	Driver S	did not, according to clerk H, habitually deliver completely.	
P <sub>8</sub>	Any who	did not, according to clerk H, habitually deliver completely	did not habitually deliver completely.	
P <sub>9</sub>	Any who	did not habitually deliver completely	did not deliver the money to clerk H.	
		CONCLUSION		
P <sub>3</sub>		Driver S did not de	liver the money to clerk H.	

# **Eliminating Redundancies**





An inference-upon-inference tree-like or pyramid argument structure of deductive inferences also reduces, with redundancies removed, to a less complex DCIT structure.


For example, Richard Whately, the English Logician and Archbishop of Dublin created such a structure in what may have been the first use of argument diagramming (Walton, 2004, p. 263).

The next slide represents this Whately (1826, p. 422 as cited in Walton, 2004, p. 263) structure. The second slide illustrates with arrows the class-inclusion transitivity inherent in this structure starting at node Z. And, finally, the third slide represents the same argument with redundancies removed as a DCIT argument structure.


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





### Inferential Net




A line of reasoning can depend on multiple layers of ASSUMPTIONS with their own lines of reasoning support .




#### MAIN CONCLUSION: Barack is a natural born citizen of the United States.




### **Argument Dialogue**



#### MAIN CONCLUSION: The President satisfies Section 1 of Article II of the U.S. Constitution.






**ARGUMENT DIALOGUE** 

COUNSEL: My line of reasoning consists of two premises: 1. The President is a natural born U.S. citizen. ...satisfies Section 1 of 2. One who is a natural born U.S. citizen satisfies Section 1 of Article II of the Article II of the U.S. Constitution. The President... U.S. Constitution. Therefore, the President satisfies Section 1 of Article II of the U.S. Constitution. CERTAINTY finish start COUNSEL'S PERSPECTIVE One who The President... is a natural born ...is a natural born U.S. citizen. U.S. citizen... ... satisfies Section 1 of Article II of the U.S. Constitution.


Dialogue




### MAIN CONCLUSION: The President satisfies Section 1 of Article II of the U.S. Constitution. COUNSEL: My line of reasoning consists of two premises: 1. The President was born in Hawaii. ...satisfies Section 1 of 2. One who was born in Hawaii is a natural born U.S. citizen. **Article II of** The President... the U.S. Therefore, the President is a natural born U.S. citizen. Constitution. CERTAINTY finish start COUNSEL'S PERSPECTIVE One who The President... One who was born in Hawaii is a natural born ... was born in ...is a natural born U.S. citizen... Hawaii. U.S. citizen. ... satisfies Section 1 of Article II of the U.S. Constitution.

Dialogue


ARGUMENT DIALOGUE







\*Toulmin, S.The Uses of Argument. (1958). Updated ed. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2003.


### Toulmin Model\*









COUNSEL: My conclusion (contention) is that "Harry is a British subject."



COURT: How did you reach that conclusion?




**COURT'S PERSPECTIVE** 




COUNSEL: My line of reasoning consists of two premises:

- 1. Harry was born in Bermuda.
- 2. One who was born in Bermuda is a British subject.


Therefore, Harry is a British subject.



COURT: How did you arrive at premise number two?




**COURT'S PERSPECTIVE** 




COUNSEL: My line of reasoning consists of two premises:

- 1. Harry meets the requirements of the British Nationality Act.
- 2. One who meets the requirements of the British Nationality Act is a British subject.


Therefore, Harry is a British subject.



COURT: OK. I agree to some extent with your premise number two and three. But how did you arrive at premise number one?



**COURT'S PERSPECTIVE** 




COUNSEL: My line of reasoning consists of two premises:

- 1. Harry has a Bermuda birth certificate.
- 2. One who has a Bermuda birth certificate <u>was born in Bermuda</u>.


Therefore, <u>Harry was born in Bermuda</u>.


# Multiple Lines of Reasoning



This argument configuration is called a "convergent" argument.


This example illustrates multiple (i.e., two) lines of reasoning justifying the same CONCLUSION. Multiple lines of reasoning may increase the subjective perception of the level of certainty of the CONCLUSION.





### This argument configuration is called a "convergent" argument.

This example illustrates multiple (i.e., two) lines of reasoning justifying the same CONCLUSION. Multiple lines of reasoning may increase the subjective perception of the level of certainty of the CONCLUSION.



This example illustrates (e.g., two) intra-lines of reasoning that branch from within the main line of reasoning that converge together to justify the same CONCLUSION.



produced a newly recertified Hawaiian birth certificate

START

**FINISH** 

### One who...

Hawaiian birth certificate was born in Hawaii

### One who...

was born in Hawaii is a natural born U.S. citizen.


### One who...

Hawaiian birth certificate has the Director's support of his Hawaiian birth claim

#### One who


has the Director's support of his Hawaiian birth claim... is a natural born U.S. citizen.

## Missing Sentences





This example illustrates a line of reasoning with one missing premise. Using this incomplete structure requires that the unstated premise(s) is obvious to the audience.


### COURT'S PERCEPTION




### COUNSEL'S PERCEPTION








This example illustrates a line of reasoning in which the ASSUMPTIONS are left unstated. While often this incomplete structure is typically used, it does create the risk that the line of reasoning is conditional on other unstated "facts."




SUBJECT COLUMN		PREDICATE COLUMN	Supporting Assumptions
1	The President	released to the Press a Hawaiian certificate of birth	?
2	Any (all/one) who (that) [PREVIOUS PREDICATE]	<u>was born in Hawaii.</u>	?
	Therefore,	CONCLUSION	
	The President	<u>was born in Hawaii.</u>	


The DCIT STEPPING STONES TEMPLATE hides the universal generalizations joined with the Predicate/Subject matches and transforms the line of reasoning from a linked "bridge" to inferentially linked "stepping stones."

This example illustrates a STEPPING STONES TEMPLATE in which the linkages normally formed by the Predicate/Subject matching is replaced with linkages based on INFERENCE STEPS.






## Inference Leap





Making apparent all the inference steps at times can make the line of reasoning appear more certain.

The amount of perceived certainty for a CONCLUSION can sometimes be increased by adding more linked premises so that there is not "too big a gap" for the audience to cross.











## Inference upon Inference



### Too many inference steps (inference-upon-inference) can become perceived as merely speculation.


1	The President's Hawaiian birth certificate	was in the official records according to the reporter as told to her by a witness who heard the Director's statement.	*******
2	Any (all/one) who (that) [REPEAT PREVIOUS PREDICATE]	was in the official records according to a witness who heard the Director's statement.	
3	Any (all/one) who (that) [REPEAT PREVIOUS PREDICATE]	was in the official records according the Director's statement.	
4	Any (all/one) who (that) [REPEAT PREVIOUS PREDICATE]	was in the official records.	
5	Any (all/one) who (that) [REPEAT PREVIOUS PREDICATE]	is authentic	
6	Any (all/one) who (that) [REPEAT PREVIOUS PREDICATE]	proves the President was born in Hawaii.	
7	Any (all/one) who (that) [REPEAT PREVIOUS PREDICATE]	proves the President is a natural born U.S. citizen.	
	Therefore, cond		
	The President's Hawaiian birth certificate	proves the President is a natural born U.S. citizen.	

## **Objections (attacks)**




An OPPOSING attack provides support for an opposite CONCLUSION from the same staring point.

There are a number of possible types of attack against a logical line of reasoning. This type is named an OPPOSING attack since it leads the in the opposing direction from the START.



An OPPOSING attack provides support for an opposite CONCLUSION from the same staring point.

There are a number of possible types of attack against a logical line of reasoning. This type is named an OPPOSING attack since it leads the in the opposing direction from the START.



This is a DIVERTING type of attack since it attempts to divert the flow of certainty within

the original line of reasoning.

The President only produced a recertified Hawaiian birth certificate

**START** 

**FINISH** 

### One who...


only produced a recertified Hawaiian birth certificate does NOT have an Original Hawaiian birth certificate.

### One who...

only produced a recertified Hawaiian birth certificate

has an Original Hawaiian birth certificate


This is a DIVERTING type of attack since it attempts to divert the flow of certainty within the original line of reasoning.




**FINISH** 

**FINISH** 


This is an OBSTRUCTING type of attack since it attempts to block the movement of certainty within the line of reasoning.



This is an OBSTRUCTING type of attack since it attempts to block the movement of certainty within the line of reasoning.



## **Structural Errors 1**



## The Queen v. David Harold Eastman / <a href="http://courts.act.gov.au/resources/attachments/Eastman10Nov95.pdf">http://courts.act.gov.au/resources/attachments/Eastman10Nov95.pdf</a>

"A defining stage in the AFP's history was the Winchester tragedy. The highest ranking police officer in Australia to be murdered, Assistant Commissioner Colin Winchester was shot twice in the head at point blank range as he was stepping from his car outside his Deakin home in the ACT at about 9.15pm on January 10, 1989.

\* \* \*

The investigation which followed ran for more than five years and led to David Harold Eastman, a Commonwealth public servant on long-term sick leave, being charged with the murder, his trial beginning in the ACT Supreme Court on May 2, 1995.


David Eastman was found guilty by unanimous jury verdict on November 3 the same year and was sentenced to life imprisonment by Justice Kenneth Carruthers, a retired judge of the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal who had been appointed by the ACT executive on a temporary basis as an Acting Judge of the ACT Supreme Court.


\* \* \*

After the trial, AFP Commissioner Mick Palmer said the investigation had been one of the most complex criminal prosecutions ever launched in this country.


It is always a difficult task to build a case based largely on circumstantial evidence. To successfully prosecute a circumstantial case against the width of public allegations and innuendo which related to the Winchester killing was, I believe, quite exceptional."


http://www.afp.gov.au/media-centre/publications/platypus/previous-editions/1999/october-1999/murder.aspx











































## **Structural Errors 2**





































## **Structural Errors 3**

































# **Structural Errors 4**






Figure 11.15: Reasoning in the box



#### Reason

Eastman was the man who purchased the Klarenbeek rifle on or about 31 December 1989



#### Reason

The purchaser of the Klarenbeek rifle already had a telescopic sight



#### Reason

Klarenbeek was offering the rifle for sale with a telescopic sight, but the purchaser of the rifle did not want the telescopic sight, and if a person does not want a telescopic sight when one is offered, that is usually because they already have one



#### Eastman already had a telescopic sight




#### Reason


When Eastman purchased the Stirling rifle from Bradshaw it had a telescopic sight but when Eastman returned the rifle to Bradshaw later that day he returned it without the sight, so Eastman kept the telescopic sight from the Bradshaw rifle





#### Reason


Eastman attempted to sell a Ruger threaded for a silencer to Reid on 4 or 5 January and the Klarenbeek rifle was threaded for a silencer, so Eastman was in possession of the Klarenbeek rifle on 4 or 5 January 1990


































### Linked premise

# Eastman...

attempted to sell a Rugei threaded for a silencer to Reid on 4 or 5 January.

## LINE OF REASONING 1

#### Linked premise X

One who attempted to sell a Ruger threaded for a silencer to Reid on 4 or 5 January.... [conceivably] was in possession of the Klarenbeek rifle on 4 or 5 January 1990.

#### (1)· X Linked premise

One who [conceivably was in possession of the Klarenbeek rifle on 4 or 5 January 1990.... was [more likely] the man who purchased the Klarenbeek rifle on or about 31 December 1989.



## Assumption

The Klarenbeek rifle... was threaded for a silencer.

#### **LINE OF REASONING 2**

## · (1): Linked premise X Linked premise

Eastman... returned to Bradshaw the Stirling rifle without returning the telescopic sight the same day he had purchased them from him.

One who returned to Bradshaw the Stirlina rifle without returning the telescopic sight the same day he had purchased them from him.... kept the telescopic sight from

the Bradsaw rifle.

### X Linked premise X Linked premise One who kept the

telescopic sight from the Bradsaw rifle... had a telescopic sight.


# One who

had a telescopic sight... was the man who purchased the Klarenbeek rifle on or about 31 December 1989.



#### Contention

Eastman... was the man who purchased the Klarenbeek rifle on or about 31 December 1989.



### LINE OF REASONING 3

X


# Linked premise

The purchaser of the Klarenbeek rifle... did not want the telescopic sight that came with the Klarenbeek rifle.

One who did not want the telescopic sight that came with the Klarenbeek rifle... already had a telescopic sight.

The purchaser of the Klarenbeek rifle... already had a telescopic sight.

# **Structural Errors 5**





# Contention Eastman was the man who purchased the Klarenbeek rifle on or about 31 December 1989. Reason The purchaser of the Klarenbeek rifle already had a telescopic sight. Reason Eastman already had a telescopic sight. Reason Eastman kept the telescopic sight from the Bradshaw rifle. Reason When Eastman returned the rifle to Bradshaw later that day he returned it without the sight.


**Figure 11.16** Co-premises as a series of inferences


When Eastman purchased the Stirling rifle from Bradshaw it had a telescopic sight.


Reason




































Linked premise X

Eastman...
returned to
Bradshaw the Stirling
rifle without returning
the telescopic sight
the same day he
had purchased
them from him.

Linked premise X Linked premise

·65.

One who returned to Bradshaw the Stirling rifle without returning the telescopic sight the same day he had purchased them from him.... kept the telescopic sight from the Bradsaw rifle.



One who kept the telescopic sight from the Bradsaw rifle... had a telescopic sight.



One who had a telescopic sight... was the man who purchased the Klarenbeek rifle on or about 31 December 1989.





The purchaser of the Klarenbeek rifle... already had a telescopic sight.





Eastman...
was the man who
purchased the Klarenbee
on or about 31 December


# Structural Errors 6























































# **Structural Errors 7**





Eastman was the man who purchased the Klarenbeek rifle on or about 31 December 1989





## Reason

Eastman visited Klarenbeek's house on 31 December 1988



Eastman already had a telescopic sight



Eastman's preferred rifle was a Ruger



\$200 in order to purchase the Klarenbeek rifle



Eastman was in possession of the Klarenbeek rifle on 4 or 5 January 1990 ...visited Klarenbeek's house on 31 December 1988.

...had already a telescopic sight.

...preferred a Ruger rifle.

...withdrew \$200 in order to purchase the Klarenbeek rifle.

...was in possession of the Klarenbeek rifle on 4 or 5 January 1990.



## Reason

Eastman visited Klarenbeek's house on 31 December 1988



Eastman already had a telescopic sight



Eastman's preferred rifle was a Ruger



Eastman withdrew \$200 in order to purchase the Klarenbeek rifle



Eastman was in possession of the Klarenbeek rifle on 4 or 5 January 1990



#### Reason

Eastman was the man who purchased the Klarenbeek rifle on or about 31 December 1989

...visited Klarenbeek's house on 31 December 1988.

...had already a telescopic sight.

...preferred a Ruger rifle.

...withdrew \$200 in order to purchase the Klarenbeek rifle.

...was in possession of the Klarenbeek rifle on 4 or 5 January 1990.



## Reason

Eastman visited Klarenbeek's house on 31 December 1988



Eastman already had a telescopic sight



Eastman's preferred rifle was a Ruger



Eastman withdrew \$200 in order to purchase the Klarenbeek rifle



Eastman was in possession of the Klarenbeek rifle on 4 or 5 January 1990



#### Reason

Eastman was the man who purchased the Klarenbeek rifle on or about 31 December 1989

Eastman was the man who purchased the Klarenbeek rifle on or about 31 December 1989.

...visited Klarenbeek's house on 31 December 1988.

...had already a telescopic sight.

...preferred a Ruger rifle.

...withdrew \$200 in order to purchase the Klarenbeek rifle.

...was in possession of the Klarenbeek rifle on 4 or 5 January 1990.



## Reason

Eastman visited Klarenbeek's house on 31 December 1988



Eastman already had a telescopic sight



Eastman's preferred rifle was a Ruger



Eastman withdrew \$200 in order to purchase the Klarenbeek rifle





Eastman was in possession of the Klarenbeek rifle on 4 or 5 January 1990





#### Reason


Eastman was the man who purchased the Klarenbeek rifle on or about 31 December 1989




































# Logic-bridge Inference



## Defeasible Class-Inclusion Transitivity (DCIT)

## LOGICAL SYNTAX

- Predication is conceptualized as solely the relationship of "belongs to the class of."
- The logical syntax of a regimented sentence is based on a binary analysis consisting of the grammarian Subject (phrase) and the Predicate (phrase) as terms. There is no analytic recognition of a copula as a third expression.
- The Predicate (phrase) begins with a verb but is homogenous with the Subject placement with the addition of the universal quantifier: "Any (All,One) such [like the Subject] who (that)."
- Only the quantifier "Any (All,One) such [like the Subject] who (that)" is given logical import. So, for example, "some" and "none" have no logical import.
- There is no analytic distinction made between the "is" of identity and the "is" of predication.
- Likelihood of membership relies on degrees of probability based on a subjective assessment.
- Issues like proto-typicality of categorical membership are reflected in the "such [like the Subject]" words in the universal quantifier.
- Inference proceeds through defeasible class-inclusion transitivity.

Inference Mode, Argument Structure, Theory of Predication, Theory of Categorization

## Defeasible Class-Inclusion Transitivity

(DCIT pronounced dee•kit)

an empirically derived theory of inference, predication, categorization, argument structure and embodied visual language

Phillips S, Wilson WH, Halford GS (2009) What do Transitive Inference and Class Inclusion have in common? Categorical (co)products and cognitive development. PLoS Comput Biol 5: e1000599.

## Defeasible Class-Inclusion Transitivity

## THEORY OF INFERENCE



Children acquire various reasoning skills over remarkably similar periods of development. Transitive Inference and Class Inclusion are two behaviours among a suite of inferential abilities that have strikingly similar developmental profiles—all are acquired around the age of five years.


Phillips S, Wilson WH, Halford GS (2009) What do Transitive Inference and Class Inclusion have in common? Categorical (co)products and cognitive development. PLoS Comput Biol 5: e1000599.

## Defeasible Class-Inclusion Transitivity

### THEORY OF INFERENCE

A transitive inference has the general form that given **aRb** and **bRc**, then one can infer **aRc**, where R is some binary relation that has the transitivity property.

For example, older children can infer that if John is taller than Mary, and Mary is taller than Sue, then John is taller than Sue. This form of reasoning is called **Transitive Inference**.



Phillips S, Wilson WH, Halford GS (2009) What do Transitive Inference and Class Inclusion have in common? Categorical (co)products and cognitive development. PLoS Comput Biol 5: e1000599.

## Defeasible Class-Inclusion Transitivity

#### THEORY OF INFERENCE

Other evidence supported the conclusion that **transitive** inference was performed, not by logical reasoning, but by constructing a mental model comprising the ordered set of premise elements. The inference could be made simply by inspecting this mental model, a process that Thayer and Collyer (1978) described as "almost perceptual" (p. 1338).

Halford, G. S., & Andrews, G. (2004). The development of deductive reasoning: How important is complexity? Thinking and Reasoning, 10, 123–145.

## Defeasible Class-Inclusion Transitivity

## THEORY OF INFERENCE



[P]articipants performed the task by representing the elements as an ordered set, **a**, **b**, **c**, **d**, **e**, **(f)**.


Repeated presentation of the premises, often over hundreds of trials, also permits simplifying strategies. For example, a can be identified as an end element because it is always less, whereas e (f) can be identified as an end element because it is always more. Once an end element is identified, the rest of the ordered set can be constructed by concatenation. With a as an end element, and given a < b, we can form the string a, b, then with b < c we can add c, yielding a, b, c, and so on.

Phillips S, Wilson WH, Halford GS (2009) What do Transitive Inference and Class Inclusion have in common? Categorical (co)products and cognitive development. PLoS Comput Biol 5: e1000599.

## Defeasible Class-Inclusion Transitivity

#### THEORY OF INFERENCE

Older children also understand that a grocery store will contain more fruit than apples. That is, the number of items belonging to the superclass is greater than the number of items in any one of its subclasses. This form of reasoning is called Class Inclusion.



Walton, Douglas, Defeasible Reasoning and Informal Fallacies (March 3, 2011). Available at SSRN: http:// ssrn.com/abstract=1775825 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1775825

## Defeasible Class-Inclusion Transitivity

### THEORY OF INFERENCE

**66** a claim being at first acceptable because it is supported by reasoning, because circumstances are present that bring the case under an exception.

'Claims can usually be challenged or opposed in two ways. First, by a denial of the facts upon which they are based and secondly by something quite different, namely a plea that although all the circumstances on which a claim could succeed are present, yet in but that is later defeated the particular case, the claim ... should not succeed because other circumstances are present which brings the case under some recognized head of exception, the effect of which is either to defeat the claim . .. altogether, or to "reduce" it ....' (1951, 147-148).

> Judging from this quotation, it would appear that Hart had the idea of a claim being at first acceptable because it is supported by reasoning, but that is later defeated because circumstances are present that bring the case under an exception. Thus we recognize the idea of a defeasible argument, of a kind so common in law.

DCIT does not rely on deduction.

The Logic-bridge uses a universal defeasible logic algebraic algorithm:


$$(A/Z) = (A/B) (B/C) (C/D) (D/E) (E/n) (n/Z)$$

That DCIT multiplication logic algorithm is related to Sommers (2000) plus/minus term-functor algebraic monotonic logic algorithm in the "New Syllogism."

Each linked premise and the conclusion is constructed as a categorical sentence with two homogenous terms consisting of a complex subject phrase and a complex predicate phrase without the use of a copula (e.g., "is", "is not"). And the term is not a restricted to a single word.

So this logic algorithm relies upon a binary logical structure (e.g., Plato) rather than the "ternary theory of logical syntax" adopted by Aristotle (Englebretsen, 1996). But the algorithm retains Aristotle's homogeneity of the terms rather than Plato's heterogeneity of terms.

Also, unlike a deductive mode of inference, the <u>Logic-bridge</u> mode of inference is defeasible. New evidence can change the certainty of the conclusion. And the amount of certainty is not a bivalent (yes/no) determination. Like fuzzy logic, it comes in degrees.



The President

has a valid Hawaiian birth certificate

B

was born in Hawaii

SUBJECT COLUMN

The President...

Any (all/one) who (that) [PREVIOUS PREDICATE]

Therefore, CONCLUSION

The President...


The process by which the <u>Logic-bridge</u> line of reasoning justifies the conclusion (mode of inference) is called Defeasible Class-Inclusion Transitivity (DCIT dee•kit).


 $\mathsf{A}$  belongs to (fits within) category  $\mathsf{B}$ .

B belongs to (fits within) category C.
Therefore (through DCIT)...


A belongs to (fits within) category C


Pollock (1995)





Pollock (1995)





## Acknowledgements

I gratefully acknowledge the years of collegial support in conventional argument mapping and mapping software by Professor Tim van Gelder (<a href="www.austhinkconsulting.com">www.austhinkconsulting.com</a>) during my association with Austhink.

I am also grateful for the years of encouragement and support of Professor Peter Tillers (<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peter Tillers">http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peter Tillers</a>) and Professor David Hitchcock <a href="http://www.humanities.mcmaster.ca/~philos/people/profile\_hitchcock.php">http://www.humanities.mcmaster.ca/~philos/people/profile\_hitchcock.php</a>).

I also want to acknowledge the encouragement and the body of work of Professor Douglas Walton (<a href="http://www.dougwalton.ca/">http://www.dougwalton.ca/</a>) that provided me with a course of study for my essential understanding of argumentation.

I also want to thank Professor John Woods (<a href="http://www.johnwoods.ca/">http://www.johnwoods.ca/</a>) for inviting me to participate in the Special Edition on "Relevancy" in the Oxford Journal, *The Journal of Logic and Computation*.

I also acknowledge the seminal work of Professor Fred Sommers (<a href="http://www.ontology.co/sommersf.htm">http://www.ontology.co/sommersf.htm</a>) and Professor George Englebretsen (<a href="http://www.ontology.co/biblio/englebretseng.htm">http://www.ontology.co/biblio/englebretseng.htm</a>) in the "New Syllogistic." The <a href="https://www.ontology.co/biblio/englebretseng.htm">Logic-bridge</a> is one approach that builds on their work in that "New Syllogistic."

Finally, I wish to gratefully acknowledge Dr. Sharone Lee for our years of ongoing discussions on the placement and utility of fact-based inquiry within the dimensional structures of knowledge.

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